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Abstract. Implementations of cryptographic algorithms using several
different Sboxes by design are typically considered burdensome. The first
reason is that unlike single-Sbox designs, serialized implementations of
such cryptographic algorithms require instantiations of all Sboxes which
prohibits the desired reduction of area. The second reason is that ap-
plying countermeasures such as masking causes an undesired increase in
area due to the amount of different nonlinear blocks in the algorithm. In
this paper, we propose a novel method to implement multi-Sbox designs
using as few nonlinear blocks as possible. We exemplify our finding on
DES algorithm of which the Triple-DES variant is still widely used in
practice. With this method, it is possible to implement the DES substitu-
tion layer, which is composed of eight 6×4 Sboxes, using only three 4-bit
nonlinear and several affine 4-bit permutations. Our investigation shows
that such an implementation requires less area than the state-of-the-art.
Moreover, it opens up the possibilities for compact implementations with
countermeasures.
1 Introduction
Technological developments in the field of low-end devices are proceeding
at a rapid pace; preserving, however, never ending implementation chal-
lenges. Driven by the very fierce constraints, two of those are of utmost
importance: silicon area and energy consumption. Based on economical
and technical limitations these two constraints remain the key factors
in today’s evolution of low-cost devices. Due to the linear relationship
between silicon area and chip manufacturing costs on one side, and the
billions of devices produced every year on the other side, the total pro-
duction cost is naturally a limiting factor.
To overcome the mentioned challenge, there have been many new
lightweight block ciphers coming out of the academic research [2,7,14,16,
20, 28, 29]. In practice, however, there are still billions of devices in the
field carrying standardized ciphers such as Advanced Encryption Stan-
dard (AES) [13], Data Encryption Standard (DES) [24] and the Rus-
sian block cipher standard GOST [1] which are not necessarily consid-
ered lightweight. The reason for the former block cipher is mainly its
high-degree 8-bit Sbox. There has been recent progress [8, 15, 17, 22] in
optimizing implementations of AES and its Sbox. However, a very lit-
tle improvement has been made on the lightweight implementations of
DES and GOST. To our knowledge, [20] provides the most significant im-
provement when lightweight implementation of DES is considered. The
mentioned implementation is serialized with 6-bit data-path. The authors
emphasize that the cost of the Sboxes is significant and suggest to use
one single alternative Sbox. In general, many multi-Sbox designs such as
Lblock [30], mCrypton [21], the Advanced Encryption Standard candi-
dates SERPENT [3] and TwoFish [27] share the same faith with DES by
lacking lightweight implementations.
Due to the usage of these algorithms in devices, such as ID cards,
smart cards, payment cards, the implementations of these algorithms are
subject to implementation attacks. The most common implementation at-
tack, namely differential power analysis (DPA), is based on observing the
power consumption of the device [19]. Countermeasures, such as mask-
ing are suggested for secure implementations [4, 9, 18, 26]. Some masking
schemes even provide security under the probing model in addition to
DPA. Masking-like countermeasures have the advantage to perform effi-
ciently when affine functions are considered. However, their implementa-
tion cost increases together with the degree of the nonlinear function to
be protected. Therefore, it is desired to implement a cryptographic algo-
rithm with minimum number of nonlinear functions. Even though there
has been ongoing research on minimizing the field multiplications per S-
box [11, 12], there has been no progress done on minimizing the number
of nonlinear permutations of a cryptographic algorithm by looking at the
full substitution layer. This also explains the lack of research on masking
of multi-Sbox designs.
Contribution. In this work, we propose a method, based on decomposi-
tions of permutations, to reduce the number of nonlinear permutations of
existing multi-Sbox designs for efficient hardware implementations. This
method not only decreases the area of the unprotected implementation,
but also creates a significant advantage for implementing masking-like
countermeasures. We illustrate the proposed method on DES. We ac-
knowledge that DES is considered insecure for many applications nowa-
days due to its 56-bit key length. However, this implementation can be
used during the implementation of its successor Triple-DES (which essen-
tially applies the DES algorithm three times with different keys to each
input data block). Triple-DES, also denoted as 3DES or TDEA, is still
massively used in the electronic payment industry. When the three con-
secutive instances of DES are applied using three different 56-bit keys,
Triple-DES provides effective 112 bits of security. In addition, we provide
implementation results and suggest design ideas to cryptographers.
Organization. We introduce the DES algorithm by detailing its sub-
functions in the following section. Our method inherits ideas from the
affine equivalence relation between the permutations and possible decom-
positions of them. An introduction to these subjects are also given in
Section 2. The details of our method and its instantiation on DES Sboxes
are provided in Section 3. We discuss our hardware implementation in
Section 4 which is followed by the conclusion.
2 Preliminaries
We denote an m × n Sbox with m input bits and n output bits (from
GF(2m) to GF(2n)) as S(x1, . . . , xm) = (y1. . . . , yn) and equivalently
S(x) = y. Alternatively, we also use S = . where . stands for table look-up
of the Sbox. We use calligraphic letters to denote a set (e.g. A) and |.|
(e.g. |A|) to denote its cardinality.
2.1 Data Encryption Standard (DES)
A single iteration of DES (Fig. 1) takes as input a 64-bit plaintext together
with a 56-bit key in order to output a 64-bit ciphertext. It is a balanced
Feistel network where only 32 bits of the state are updated per round.
The round function RF which takes a 32-bit input and a 48-bit round
key follows the steps below:
Expansion. The 32-bit input is divided into eight 4-bit chunks. Each
chunk is extended to 6 bits by inheriting the first (resp. last) bit from its
adjacent chunk on the right (resp. left). Hence this operation duplicates
half of the input bits to generate a 48-bit output.























Fig. 1: DES block cipher
Substitution. The 48-bit output of key mixing is split into eight 6-bit
chunks. Each 6-bit chunk is substituted to a 4-bit block using a different
6 × 4 Sbox. Hence, the substitution layer is composed of eight different
Sboxes. These Sboxes are designed so that they can be represented as four
4-bit permutations (hereto mini-Sboxes). The outer bits (x1, x6) are used
to select which mini-Sbox is used whereas the inner bits (x2, x3, x4, x5)
are responsible for the look-up.
Permutation. The 32-bit output of the substitution layer is bit-wise per-
muted using a special permutation matrix.
Key schedule It is used to generate 48-bit round keys from the 56-bit
master key. This generation is simply rotation and selection.
We refer to [10] for more detailed description.
2.2 Affine Equivalence Relation
For our efficient implementation, we mainly consider the 4-bit mini-Sboxes.
Since these Sboxes are permutations, we focus on some properties of per-
mutations in this section.
The set of all n-bit permutations form the symetric group S2n . This
set can be split using the affine equivalence relation between Sboxes as
defined below:
Definition 1. Two permutations S1(x) and S2(x) are affine equivalent
if there exists a pair of affine permutations A(x) and B(x), such that
S1 = B ◦ S2 ◦A.
Each group of n-bit permutations that are affine equivalent form a
class. Hence, all the Sboxes in a class can be represented with a designated
representative Sbox from the same class. Every Sbox in the same class
has the same algebraic degree. Moreover, every Sbox in a class are either
in the Alternating group A2n or not. Being in A2n implies that the Sbox
can be represented with even number of transpositions. The set of non-
Alternating permutations are denoted by S2n \ A2n .
Following the notation in [6], we represent linear, quadratic and cubic
affine equivalence classes of 4-bit permutations as Ai, Qi and Ci where i
stands for the class number when classes are ordered lexicographically. We
refer to [6] for the list of all 302 affine-equivalence classes’ representatives
of 4-bit permutations.
It has been shown in [6] that there exist one affine, six quadratic and
295 cubic classes of 4-bit permutations. It is well known that all the affine
permutations are in A16. Moreover, all the quadratic 4-bit permutations
are shown to be in A16. From the remaining cubic permutations, only 144
of them are in A16. For the representatives of these specific classes, we
refer the reader to [6].
2.3 Decomposition
Decomposition of a cubic Sbox S into two quadratic Sboxes S1 and S2,
such that S = S1 ◦ S2 is first proposed in [25] for the 4-bit PRESENT
Sbox to ease the application of a countermeasure. Later in [5,6] this idea
has been generalized to all 4-bit permutations with sometimes more than
two Sboxes in decomposition (S = S1 ◦ S2 ◦ . . . ◦ Ss) as follows.
Let M define the set of all six quadratic permutation classes {Q004,
Q012,Q293,Q294,Q299,Q300} = M. It has been shown that all permuta-
tions in A16 can be decomposed using permutations from M. Note that
the possibility to decompose some cubic Sboxes to quadratics but not all
can be described with the fact that all 4-bit quadratic permutations are
in A16 as do the cubic classes with quadratic decomposition. The decom-
position length of these cubic classes, which is defined as the minimum
number of quadratic permutations used in such decompositions varies be-
tween two and four. Naturally, it is also possible to decompose these cubic
Sboxes into one cubic and one quadratic permutation from A16.
The rest of the cubic permutations, which are in S16 \ A16, can be
represented using one cubic (∈ S16 \ A16) and one or more quadratic
permutations (∈ A16). In [5, 6], such decompositions are generated us-
ing the cubic permutations from a certain set of Sboxes, namely N =
{C001, C003, C013, C301}. It has been shown that the permutations in N
have special properties that are advantageous when masking is consid-
ered. Even though we do not explicitly use these properties, we choose to
use these classes when permutations form ∈ S16 \ A16 are required.
3 Decomposition to Simplify Multi-Sbox Designs
Even thought there exists prior applications of particular Sboxes using
decomposition, it is the first time that such a method is applied in order
to reduce the implementation overhead of multi-Sbox designs and obtain
a compact implementation on hardware. Here, we mainly describe our
method on DES for easy understanding and provide implementation re-
sults for it. However, this method can be applied to other designs such as
GOST [1], SERPENT [3] TwoFish [27], Lblock [30] and mCrypton [21].
3.1 Methodology
As mentioned in Section 2.1, DES comprises of eight different 6×4 Sboxes,
which can be represented as 32 different 4× 4 mini-Sboxes. This presents
a challenge for a compact hardware implementation, since all of them
need to be implemented (instantiated) separately.
Idea. In order to minimize the cost of several different Sboxes, we aim to
decompose them such that minimum number of nonlinear permutations
is used to jointly describe all mini-Sboxes. Therefore, we search for one
or more decompositions of the mini-Sboxes that hold for as many Sboxes
as possible.
Possible decompositions. It is known that the 32 mini-Sboxes of DES be-
long to 21 different affine equivalent classes [6]. Nine of these classes are in
A16, specifically they are from the set {C046, C073, C085, C086, C148, C184, C221,
C254, C281} = K. As described in Section 3, being in A16 implies that an
Sbox in K can be decomposed into a permutation fromM and a permu-
tation from A16. Given the affine equivalence relation, one can search for
a solution of the form
SK = C ◦ F ◦B ◦GK ◦A (left decomposition)
SK = C ◦GK ◦B ◦ F ◦A (right decomposition) (1)
for the mini-Sboxes in K. Here, SK is the representative of the targeted
mini-Sbox, GK is a quadratic permutation from one of the classes in M,
F is a permutation from A16, and A,B,C are affine permutations.
The remaining 12 mini-Sboxes are in S16\A16, specifically from the set
{C059, C069, C079, C098, C117, C137, C139, C166, C204, C220, C257, C279} = L. Simi-
lar to the previous case, one can search for a solution of the form
SL = C ◦ F ◦B ◦GL ◦A (left decomposition)
SL = C ◦GL ◦B ◦ F ◦A (right decomposition) (2)
where SL is the representative of the targeted mini-Sbox, GL is a per-
mutation from N , F is a permutation from A16, and A,B,C are affine
permutations. Note that it is possible to find solutions where GL is a
permutation from S16 \A16 but not strictly from N . Here, we ignore such
decompositions for reasons described in Section 3.
Goal. We aim to find F in A16 such that it satisfies Equations (1) and (2)
and is the same for all these mini-Sboxes.
Algorithm to achieve the goal. We propose the following algorithm (we
are considering thereafter the left decomposition only since for the right
decomposition the method is similar):
1. Take one representative permutation SK, SL, GK and GL for each
class in K, L, M and N respectively.
2. Compute DK = SK ◦ (A)−1 ◦ (GK)−1 and DL = SL ◦ (A)−1 ◦ (GL)−1
for all possible affine permutations A, i.e for all permutations in class
A000 where |A000| = 322, 560. Since |K| = 9 and |M| = 6, there exists
9 × 322, 560 × 6 solutions for DK. Similarly, |L| = 12 and |N | = 4
provides 12×322, 560×4 solutions for DL. In total, we get 9×322, 560×
6+12×322, 560×4 = 32, 901, 120 solutions for this left decomposition.
We cluster them in 9×6+12×4 = 102 groups each containing 322,560
solutions.
3. Cluster the groups in super groups of 9+12 = 21 in total, i.e. for each
mini-Sbox class.
4. Search for a class from A16 which is present in all these super groups
(recall that A16 contains 151 classes).
5. If such a class exists, find F ∈ A16, which satisfies the relation DK =
C ◦ F ◦ B (and correspondingly DL = C ◦ F ◦ B), and hence Equa-
tions (1) and (2).
Note that we abuse the notation for A,B,C constantly which is cer-
tainly different for all mini-Sbox representatives SK and SL.
3.2 Results
Applying the algorithm in Section 3.1, we found 12 solutions for the left
decomposition and another 12 for the right decomposition – so in total
24 solutions. The found common class where F lies is one of {C158, C159}.
In Table 1, we summarize our solutions. It can be observed that by fixing
C158 or C159 , we get 4 or 8 solutions respectively for left decomposition
(alternatively 8 or 4 solutions respectively for right decomposition).
Left Decomp. Right Decomp.
K
C158 ×Q293 Q012 × C158
C158 ×Q299 Q293 × C158
C159 ×Q012 Q294 × C158
C159 ×Q293 Q299 × C158
C159 ×Q294 Q293 × C159
C159 ×Q299 Q299 × C159
L
C158 × C013 C013 × C158
C158 × C301 C301 × C158
C159 × C013 C013 × C159
C159 × C301 C301 × C159
Table 1: Possible solutions for decomposing DES mini-Sboxes.
However, note that we only considered the representatives of the DES
mini-Sboxes so far. In order to obtain the final solution for each of the 32
mini-Sboxes, we take into account that they are affine equivalent to the
representative SK (or SL), i.e. S = C ′ ◦ SK ◦ A′ (or S = C ′ ◦ SL ◦ A′),
where S is one of the 32 mini-Sboxes, C ′ and A′ are affine permutations
(i.e. from class A000).
Therefore the representation for S becomes S = C ′ ◦ C ◦ F ◦ B ◦
GK ◦ A ◦ A′ (or S = C ′ ◦ C ◦ GK ◦ B ◦ F ◦ A ◦ A′) if S ∈ A16 and
S = C ′ ◦ C ◦ F ◦ B ◦ GL ◦ A ◦ A′ (or S = C ′ ◦ C ◦ GL ◦ B ◦ F ◦ A ◦ A′)
if S ∈ S16 \ A16. Obviously, C ′ ◦ C and A ◦ A′ can be replaced by one
single affine permutation. For simplicity we represent this compositions
with C and A respectively and reach the final decomposition for all 32
mini-Sboxes given in Equation (1) and (2) correspondingly.
Hereon, we refer to the jth mini-Sbox of the ith DES Sbox as Sij ,
where 1 ≤ i ≤ 8, 0 ≤ j ≤ 3. As described in Equation (1) and (2), these
mini-Sboxes belong to either of the two defined cases (denoted hereafter
with Sijleft and S
ij
right). Furthermore, each of these mini-Sboxes can be
represented as explained in the previous section as a composition of two
higher-degree (quadratic or cubic) and three affine vectorial boolean func-
tions (permutations). In other words:
Sijleft =

Cij ◦ F ◦Bij ◦GK ◦Aij , if (i, j) ∈ {(1, ∗), (5, 1), (5, 2), (5, 3),
(6,1), (6,2), (7,3), (8,3)}
Cij ◦ F ◦Bij ◦GL ◦Aij , if (i, j) ∈ {(2, ∗), (3, ∗), (4, ∗), (5, 0),




Cij ◦GK ◦Bij ◦ F ◦Aij , if (i, j) ∈ {(1, ∗), (5, 1), (5, 2), (5, 3),
(6,1), (6,2), (7,3), (8,3)}
Cij ◦GL ◦Bij ◦ F ◦Aij , if (i, j) ∈ {(2, ∗), (3, ∗), (4, ∗), (5, 0),
(6,0), (6,3), (7,0), (7,1), (7,2), (8,0),
(8,1), (8,2)}
where GK is quadratic, and GL and F are cubic vectorial Boolean func-
tions and Aij , Bij , Cij are affine. As we can see, F , GK, and GL can be
shared for all the mini-Sboxes and therefore make the whole implemen-
tation considerably smaller.
Due to page limitations, we provide only one possible tuple (F,GK, GL)
out of 24 tuples that satisfy the solution for the DES Sbox (12 solutions
for Sijleft and 12 for S
ij
right) in Table 2. For each tuple, the affine vecto-
rial Boolean functions Aij , Bij , Cij are then uniquely determined. The
representations in Table 2 are in the form of lookup tables. The others
solutions are equivalent and trivial to derive.
Table 2: DES Sbox decomposition (one of the 24 possible representations).
F 0123458A6BCF7D9E GK 0123457689CDEFBA GL 0123456789CDEFBA
A10 43DA8F169E0752CB B10 0145ABEFCD896723 C10 6B0D94F21C7AE385
A11 EDB874213065A9FC B11 0145ABEFCD896723 C11 618FDA349E7025CB
A12 43168FDA9ECB5207 B12 0145ABEFCD896723 C12 5E92A16DB07C4F83
A13 7F6E2A3B8091D5C4 B13 0514AFBE9C8D3627 C13 B4691EC378A5D20F
A20 2156DEA90374FC8B B20 02318AB94675CEFD C20 971F5BD34AC2860E
A21 78D23C96F05AB41E B21 57021346ECB9A8FD C21 79F1E0683DB5A42C
A22 7C1AE583294FB0D6 B22 BFC8EA9D26517304 C22 EAD926158CBF4073
A23 D7A0C6B15F284E39 B23 5261E9DA7043CBF8 C23 9E2561DA70CB8F34
A30 E079B52CA43DF168 B30 5F0A4E1BC693D782 C30 F27AD058E36BC149
A31 52BC709EDA34F816 B31 8F439E5261AD70BC C31 06357142BD8ECAF9
A32 F30C956A48B72ED1 B32 BFC8EA9D26517304 C32 9A12ED658B03FC74
A33 E68091F74C2A3B5D B33 1A29380BF4C7D6E5 C33 A0E46C285F1B93D7
A40 8FAD0725E9CB6143 B40 5261E9DA7043CBF8 C40 2FC1D03E947A6B85
A41 89AB2301EFCD4567 B41 5261E9DA7043CBF8 C41 8F3470CB61DA9E25
A42 5270DAF83416BC9E B42 5261E9DA7043CBF8 C42 8F3470CB61DA9E25
A43 5270DAF83416BC9E B43 5261E9DA7043CBF8 C43 295ED6A1F4830B7C
A50 EA7326BF049DC851 B50 5F0A4E1BC693D782 C50 7AF258D03EB61C94
A51 A8B975643120ECFD B51 021346578A9BCEDF C51 AF0514BE72D8C963
A52 7EA3D40918C5B26F B52 0123456789ABCDEF C52 7F3BD5914C08E6A2
A53 AE40FB158C62D937 B53 0167EF89CDAB2345 C53 72BEFA369C5014D8
A60 28F56CB10AD74E93 B60 EBC963412705AF8D C60 A41F972CE05BD368
A61 EFAB1054DC982367 B61 01236745EFCD89AB C61 C70B834F5E921AD6
A62 A578F02DC31E964B B62 04152637BFAE9D8C C62 8CBF4073EAD92615
A63 B9CE46318AFD7502 B63 02318AB94675CEFD C63 8FADBC9E34160725
A70 F719D53B806EA24C B70 8F439E5261AD70BC C70 DEB8A9CF30564721
A71 E284C0A6593F7B1D B71 8C37AE1504BF269D C71 BA103298FE5476DC
A72 027564138AFDEC9B B72 5261E9DA7043CBF8 C72 9E70618F43ADBC52
A73 AC8E1735BD9F0624 B73 02468ACE9BDF1357 C73 E6193BC4A25D7F80
A80 C74F921A38B06DE5 B80 B8FC03471256A9ED C80 896754BACD2310FE
A81 2A6E91D5B3F7084C B81 831A29B07CE5D64F C81 B193280AC6E45F7D
A82 905CF63AE72B814D B82 BF73AE628C409D51 C82 086E91F7C4A25D3B
A83 56A912EDCF308B74 B83 0167CDAB2345EF89 C83 0437C8FBAE9D6251
4 Hardware Implementation
We consider a serialized structure for our lightweight implementation
which uses one-Sbox block that can calculate all DES Sboxes. The small-
est DES implementation known so far, presented in [20] is an example of
such a serialized structure. For compatibility, we inherit the mentioned
implementation together with the same 6-bit input 4-bit output behavior
of the S-box layer in our implementation.
Our implementation does not possess any countermeasures against
physical attacks. However, we emphasize that this one-Sbox structure,
which only has three nonlinear permutation blocks F , GK, GL, is highly
advantageous when countermeasures such as masking are considered. This
is due to the fact that implementing a nonlinear function in masked do-
main is very challenging whereas a linear function can be implemented
in a straight-forward way. Moreover, it has been shown in [4] that the
required number of shares for linear functions is smaller than that of
nonlinear functions.
4.1 Instantiation of the multi-Sbox design
We focus on the specific solution suggested in Table 2 out of the 24
equivalent choices. Figure 2 represents a block diagram of our DES Sbox
architecture. The input of the Sbox consists of 6 bits of which the two
outer bits will be used together with the 3-bit clock counter of one round
in order to decide which mini-Sbox calculation operation is followed. We
denote this selection bits as sel. The remaining 4 bits of the input are
sent to the first affine permutation layer. Depending on the calculated
mini-Sbox, and hence the value of sel, the input of the nonlinear function
GK or GL is selected from the outputs of Aij . The output of GK (resp.
GL) is used as input to the second affine permutation layer. Similar to
the previous step, the input of the nonlinear permutation F is chosen
from the outputs of Bij with the help of sel. The output of F is sent
to the final layer of affine permutations Cij . The correct output of the
DES Sbox is chosen from the outputs of Cij using the sel. There are no
registers in this implementation.
Please note that several affine permutation blocks, specifically A43, B11,
B12, B32, B40, B41, B42, B43, B50, B63, B70, B72 and C32 (i.e. 13 in total)
are represented with dotted lines and they are not connected. This is due
to the fact that these permutation blocks are equivalent to other per-











































































































Fig. 2: Substitution layer of DES composed of 8 Sboxes (equivalently 32
mini-Sboxes).
A42 = A43
B10 = B11 = B12






Table 3: List of affine permutations that are equal.
4.2 Synthesis Results
We implemented the proposed method and all eight 6× 4 Sboxes of DES
for a fair comparison (i.e. we assumed 6-bit input and 4-bit output includ-
ing the final multiplexer which is also depicted in Fig 2). We described
both options as their corresponding Boolean function representation and
let our synthesis tool (Synopsys Design Vision D-2010.03-SP4) optimize
these functions using the compile ultra command. Synthesis results show
40% decrease of hardware (1017 GE vs. 603 GE) area when 45nm Nan-
Gate standard cell library is used [23].
Moreover, we also implemented DES in a serialized manner as sug-
gested in [20] by replacing the Sbox with ours. The synthesis with the
mentioned settings yields 2089 GE. Since our library and the library used
by [20] are different as well as the synthesis tools, we can not directly
compare the exact GE values. In [20], it has been stated that 32% of the
area is consumed by the Sboxes. Following this metric, we conclude that
our Sbox which employs 28% of the area is smaller.
We repeated the same analysis with Cadance RTL Compiler RC14.22
and the same library since the performance of the optimization can vary
depending on the synthesis tool. We got similar results.
Note that the variety of the affine permutations which also increases
the amount of the multiplexers consume a big ratio of the area. We em-
phasize that it is possible to minimize such cost with careful selection of
Sboxes during the design process.
5 Conclusion
We discuss a novel method to describe many permutations of the same size
with high degree using fewer smaller degree permutations using the affine
equivalence relation between their decompositions. We exemplified our
method on DES algorithm for which we used only one quadratic, two cubic
4-bit permutations instead of 32 cubic 4-bit permutations or equivalently
eight degree five functions. We leave other instantiations of this work to
the reader. Moreover, the mentioned method not only has the advantage
of resulting with smaller implementations, but also leads to possible low-
cost implementations with countermeasures since it minimizes the number
of nonlinear elements in the description.
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